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NoTEs
RIPARIAN RIGHTS-ANALYSIS OF NEW STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
The rights of landowners to use the water resources on and con-
tiguous to their land have been substantially clarified in Kentucky by
the enactment of House Bill 497 (published in Statutes as Ky. BREv.
STAT. sec. 262.670 to 262.690) during the 1954 session of the Ken-
tucky General Assembly.1 The droughts of the two preceding years
caused more farmers throughout the state to turn to the streams and
lakes bordering their land to satisfy their needs. This extensive use of
riparian water increased the probability of a greater number of in-
juries to other riparian owners, and a demand for a more satisfactory
definition of riparian rights arose. With this condition in mind, the
legislature considered this problem together with the problem of con-
servation of excess water in riparian streams, and set forth in this act
a basic statement of the rights of landowners in public waters. The
act also provides for the Legislative Research Commission to make a
thorough study of all problems relating to water resources, and to
report its findings to the 1956 legislature.
Before considering the sections of the act itself, some basic prin-
ciples governing a landowner's right to use water should be stated.
A riparian proprietor is one who owns land which abutts a natural
stream, and riparian rights are those which such a proprietor has in
the stream.2 In general, the owner of land has a comparatively un-
limited right to the undisturbed use of his land. The principles of
ownership and use applying to land also apply to surface water found
on the land. This means in effect that one's right to use non-riparian
water is exclusive. Because of the fugitive nature of riparian water,
which is water flowing in a stream, the landowner's rights and privi-
leges to use this kind of water are less absolute.3 He in fact has a non-
exclusive right to use this water.
This characteristic of riparian rights stemmed historically from the
Roman Law principle that all of the riparian owners had a mutuality
of right in the stream, so that the extent of the right of any riparian
owner depends on the effect his use has on the other riparian owners'
use. Although this principle originated in Roman Law, it was made a
I An act relating to the conservation, development and use of water resources,
affective July 1, 1954, after being passed with only two opposing votes in the
House and one in the Senate.
-"Briefly, a riparian proprietor is one whose land is bounded or traversed by
a natural stream, and riparian rights are those which such a proprietor has to the
use of the stream or water." 56 Am. Jur. 726 (1947).
8 See, BXSTAM .MNT, TORTS (1938) Topic 3 following sec. 849 giving a gen-
eral discussion of these principles.
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foundation stone in the common law doctrine of riparian rights by
Anglo-American courts.
4
In applying this common law doctrine, the American courts par-
ticularly have used two ideas to measure the extent of the riparian
right. In the first place, they have made a distinction between using
water for a "natural" purpose and using it for an "artificial" purpose.
If the riparian proprietor uses the water in a stream for such domestic
purposes as watering his stock or supplying his household necessities,
he is using it for a "natural" purpose, and he will not be liable to an-
other landowner for this use even though the water in the stream is
completely diminished. 5 Where the upper riparian proprietor uses
the water in the stream on his land for "artificial" purposes such as
manufacturing or irrigation,0 he may use only so much of the water
as will not deny to the lower owner an equality of use. In the second
place, a distinction is made between the "natural flow" theory and the
"reasonable use" theory for the purpose of determining equality in
use. Under the natural flow theory the riparian landowner has the
privilege to use the water so long as such use does not effect the
natural quantity or quality of the water. Under the reasonable use
theory the riparian landowner has the right to use so much of the
water as will not unreasonably interfere with the use of others.7
The Court of Appeals has not settled upon one or the other of
'There was no common law doctrine of riparian rights in the sense that the
words are used to convey a concept of early English law of water rights. The uses
of the streams by a riparian proprietor before the industrial revolution were limited
to occupations such as running mills, and the doctrine which the En ,ish courts
applied to Proteet the rights of owners was relatively simple, namely, 'first come,
first served.' The law of riparian rights after originating in America, did not come
to England until 1820 and 1840, and it might therefore more properly be called a
"modern common law doctrine. See, supra note 8. See also, Busby, American
Water Rights Law: A Brief Synopsis of Its Origin and Some of Its Broad Trends
with Special Reference to the Beneficial Use of Water Resources, 5 S.C.L.Q.
(1952).
, Wiel, Water Rights in Western States, see. 740 (1911) states as follows:
"Natural uses are those arising out of necessities of life on the riparian land, such
as household use, drinking, watering domestic animals. For these purposes the
riparian owner may take the whole stream if necessary, leaving none to go down
to lower riparian proprietors." Also in sec. 741 it is stated: "The term 'natural uses'
is probably based on the idea running through other branches of the common law,
that there is such a thing as an 'ordinary' or 'naturar or elemental use of the land;
a use, so to speak, for which nature intended it, in contrast with other uses to
which land is put. -If, in using the land in the natural or ordinary way, damage
follows to a neighbor, it is not wrongful at law; it is damnum absque injuria."
'Lone Tree Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 26 S.D. 307, 128 N.W. 596, 598
(1910) said: "These rights of riparian owners have at all times been divided into
two classes, dependent upon the use to which the water is to be put, which uses
have been variously denominated 'ordinary' or 'extraordinary' and 'natural or
'artificial.' The so-called... natural use includes the use of the water for domestic
purposes and for watering stock. The extraordinary .. . use including manu-
facturing, mining, and irrigation."
"Supra note 3.
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these two theories, and prior to the enactment of this statute Ken-
tucky had no basic statutory law on the question. From the cases
decided, it is difficult to determine whether the court has applied
the reasonable use theory or the natural flow theory.8 In the last
case decided concerning the right to use water in a stream or lake,9
the court said that even though the distinction between the two
theories was very close, it was committed to the natural flow theory,
but the theory that the court applied to the facts which were being
considered at that time was the reasonable use theory.10 The con-
fusion in this one case is sufficient to show why some have taken the
position that Kentucky does not apply either theory in the cases, but
applies a little of both.1 The new legislation attempts to set out some
applicable basic principles designed to establish a reasonable use
theory in this state.
The action of the state, provided for in the act, is authorized under
the well-defined power of the state to regulate the rights of private
landowners and to permit the appropriation of flowing waters for
such purposes as it may deem wise.12 Also section 1 of House Bill 497
(Ky. REv. STAT. see. 262.670) declares that the welfare of the people
demands that the natural water resources of the state be conserved
and regulated under the general welfare clause of the state constitu-
tion.13 Apparently it was felt by the General Assembly that this state-
8 "It is true, as suggested by counsel for appellant, that our court is com-
mitted to the 'natural flow rule' though as we read the two rules (Reasonable
Use) ... the distinction is rather dose, and even under what may be termed the
more restricted theory, [natural flow] . . .each riparian owner is recognized as
having a privilege to use the water to supply his natural wants, and extraordinary
or artificial uses, so that such does not sensibly or materially affect the quantity
of the water and such uses by a lower riparian owner." City of Louisville v. Tway,
297 Ky. 565, 569; 180 S.W. 2d 278, 280 (1944). See also, 40 Ky. L.J. 428
"ibid.
" Id. at 570, 180 S.W. 2d 281. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky said:
"There was a failure to show that either Mrs. Hert or Mr. Tway made unreason-
able use of the water from the stream or springs, and there is not suicient evidence
that the acts charged seriously or unreasonably amounted to such an iniury to the
lower riparian owner (or owners) as will entitle them to an injunction.
"It must be concluded from these two cases and the language used by the
court in its opinions that the Kentucky rule lies somewhere between the natural
flow theory andth e reasonable use theory. It is believed that Kentucky would not
permit as extensive a use of the water for irrigation in a particular fact situation
as would a jurisdiction which applies the reasonable use theory strictly. On the
other hand, it might be said with equal safety that the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky would go further than would a court applying the natural flow theory
strictly." 40 Ky. L.J. 423 at 430 (1951).
"Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1981); U.S. v. Rio Grande
Dam and Irrigation Co. 174 U.S. 690 (1898).
"Ky. Ra,. STAT. sec. 2962.670 provides in full: "The conservation, develop-
ment and proper use of the water resources of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
has become increasingly important as a result of technological advances, agri-
cultural production problems and varied I industrial, municipal and recreational
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ment in section 1 was needed to assure the constitutionality of the
legislation under the state constitution.
. Section 2 (Ky. BEv. STAT. sec. 262.680) is an express statement of
the scope of the regulation of the act.14 It is made in terms of "public
water" which is defined primarily as riparian water as follows:
Water occurring in any natural stream, natural lake or other natural
water body in the Commonwealth which may be applied to any use-
ful and beneficial purpose is hereby declared to be a natural resource
and public water of the Commonwealth and subject to control and
regulation for the public welfare.' 5
"Diffused surface water"16 flowing over the surface of the ground
and "water left standing in natural pools" 1 after the streams have
receded are excluded from the classification of public waters, and
they are not to be regulated.
Diffused surface waters are casual waters flowing on the surface
of the land which have not found their way to the stream. By exclud-
ing this type of water from the regulation of the act, one is led to
believe that it could be used without limitation, which is the existing
case law.' s But to also exclude water left in pools in the bed of the
stream, and thereby permit an exclusive use of it, seems to be a sig-
nificant alteration in the rights of riparian landowners. After water
has reached the stream channel, it is generally treated as riparian
uses. Excessive rainfall at certain seasons causes damages from overflowing
streams. Prolonged droughts at other seasons curtail industrial, municipal, agri-
cultural and recreational uses of water and threaten the economic well being of
the Commonwealth. The advancement of the safety, happiness and protection of
property of the people require that power inherent in the people be utilized to
promote and to regulate the conservation, development and proper use of the
water resources. It is hereby declared that the general welfare requires that the
water resources of the Commonwealth be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent
of which they are capable, and that the waste or non-beneficial use of water be
prevented, and that the conservation and beneficial use of water be ex-
ercised in the interest of the people. The proper investment of public and
private funds to promote the conservation and beneficial use of water resources
is recognized as being in the public interests and such investments shall be en-
couraged."
'KY. Rxv. STAT. 262.680 provides in full: "Water occurring in any natural
stream, natural lake or other natural water body in the Commonwealth which may
be applied to any useful and beneficial purpose is hereby declared to be a
natural resource and public water of the Commonwealth and subject to control
and regulation for the public welfare. Diffused surface water which flows
vagrantly over the surface of the ground shall not be regarded as public water,
and the owner of the land on which such water falls or flows shall have the
right to its use. Water left standing in natural pools in a natural stream when the
natural flow of the stream has ceased shall not be regraded as public water and





-' Republic Production Co. v. Collins, 41 S.W. 2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931);
Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 40 Am. Rep. 519 (1881).
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water even after it has stopped its motion. Prior to the statute the
riparian proprietor could use water left in pools in the bed of the
stream only to the extent that his use did not prejudice the lower
riparian landowner.' 9 The right of the lower owner was obviously
somewhat hypothetical since the water would not flow down stream,
but in any event, the legislature apparently felt that by not applying
the riparian rights to this kind of water, the advantages to be
achieved would compensate for a change in the law. The farmer is
now clearly given another source of water to use freely in a time of
teed without having to follow the pattern established by the sub-
sequent sections of this Act.
One of the most significant sections of House Bill 497 is section
3 (Ky. REv. STAT. see. 262.690) which sets forth the rights of landowners
to use the public waters of the state.20 The first of the three sub-
sections deals with the superior right of the landowner to use public
water contiguous to his land in an amount sufficient to "satisfy his
needs for domestic purposes." - The right of the riparian landowner
to use water for domestic purposes without being liable to a lower
riparian owner has been an established principle in the law,22 but the
definition of what the domestic purposes are to include has not been
set out in any detail. In Kentucky many of the cases have referred to
domestic purposes as merely being the "ordinary" purposes of a farm.23
Subsection 1 expressly declares that domestic purposes will now in-
"Humphries Mexico Co. v. Arseneaux, 116 Tex. 603, 297 S.W. 2d 225 (1927).
'°Ky. REv. STAT. 262.690 provides in fall: "(1) The owner of land contiguous
to public water shall at all times have the right to the use of water therefrom
in the quantity necessary to satisfy his needs for domestic purposes, which shall
include water for household purposes, drinking water for livestock, poultry and
domestic animals. The.use of the water for such domestic purposes shall have
priority and be superior to any and all other uses.
"(2) The owner of land contiguous to public water shall have the right to
such reasonable use of this water for other than domestic purposes as will not
deny the use of such water to other owners for domestic purposes, or impair
existing uses of other owners heretofore established, or unreasonably interfere
with a beneficial use by other owners.
"(8) An owner or group of owners of land contiguous to public water shall
have the right to impound and conserve such water for their use by impounding
such water behind a dam in a natural stream bed or on their land or by pumping
such water from the stream or lake to a reservoir when the flow in the stream or
the level of the lake is in excess of existing reasonable uses. An obstruction placed
across a natural stream shall provide an outlet for the release of water which the
owner is not entitled to use under this Act, and the owner shall operate the outlet
in accordance with this provision."
= Ibid.
'Kentucky: Anderson v. Cincinnati So. Ry., 86 Ky. 44, 5 S.W. 49 (1887);
Redman v. Forman, 83 Ky. 214 (1885). Other Jurisdictions: Harvey Realty Co.
v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 AUt. 60 (1930); People v. Hulbert,
81 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902); Garwood v. New York C. & H. R.R. Co., 83
N.Y. 400, 38 Am. Rep. 452 (1880).
1 Redman v. Forman, 83 Ky. 214 (1885).
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elude "household purposes, drinking water for livestock, poultry and
domestic animals."
A great deal of the vagueness revolving around domestic purposes
as defined in the cases will be eliminated by this elaboration, but the
provision of the act is not without possible difficulty. Suppose a large
herd of livestock owned and raised for commercial sale by an upper
riparian owner decreases the amount of water left in a stream to the
extent that a lower riparian owner is deprived of an amount sufficient
for his domestic needs. Can this use be justified on the grounds that
it is for a "domestic purpose" since the statute includes the phrase
"drinking water for livestock"? Domestic purposes in this subsection
are meant to include common law natural uses which arise out of the
necessities of life on the land and form a constituent part of the land.
To allow a riparian proprietor to satisfy the watering needs of a
great number of livestock in order to sell them commercially without
being liable to a lower owner for any damage, is to permit a use
which was not meant to be included within the definition of "domestic
purposes" of the act. A possible solution would be to define further
domestic purposes by limiting the "drinking water of livestock," as
provided in the statute, to non-commercial livestock only.
After thus providing the first right that a riparian proprietor has
to the use of public water, the act proceeds to define another right
which he has in the water. In subsection 2 of section 3 (Ky. REv. STAT.
sec. 262.690) the legislature has attempted to provide a basic theory
which will give all riparian proprietors the right to use public water
without being liable to another riparian proprietor.24 Subsection 2 pro-
vides as follows:
The owner of land contiguous to public water shall have the right to
such reasonable use of this water for other than domestic purposes
as will not deny the use of such water to other owners for domestic
purposes or impair existing uses of other owners heretofore established,
or unreasonably interfere with a beneficial use by other owners. (Em-
phasis supplied by writer)
The statute expressly states that a riparian proprietor shall have
the right to the "reasonable use" of public water2 5 The amount of
Supra note 20.
Supra note 20, subsec. 2.
RESTATEMENT, TonTs sec. 852 provides: "A riparian proprietor's use of
water is unreasonable . . . unless the utility of the use outweighs the gravity of
the harm." Comment C provides: "Determination of unreasonableness. The de-
termination in a particular case of the unreasonableness of a particular use is not
and should not be unreasoned, intuitive conclusion on the part of a court or jury.
It is rather an evaluating of the conflicting interests of each of the contestants
before the court in accordance with the standards of society, and a weighing of
these one against the other."
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water which may be extracted from the stream without being an
unreasonable portion will have to be decided by cases which will arise
later in applying the statute.20
There is an attempt by the legislature to provide some analysis as
to how the reasonable use theory is to be applied. The statute says
that the riparian landowner has the right to the reasonable use of the
water in a stream as long as there is enough left to supply a lower
owner's domestic purposes. This is a reemphasis of the point that
uses for domestic purposes are to have priority over other uses, which
is stipulated in the preceding subsection of the statute. The statute
further states that the upper riparian proprietor must also reasonably
respect the uses of other riparian owners already established and the
right of others to their beneficial use of the water.
The language of section 3 subsection 2 (Ky. REv. STAT. sec.
262.690) is plain and unambiguous except in one possible place.
Looking at the language of the subsection as it is set out above, it is
seen that the act provides that a riparian owner shall have the right
to the reasonable use of water which will not deny others sufficient
water for domestic purposes, "or impair existing uses of the owners
heretofore established. . . ." Nowhere in the quoted phrase does the
word unreasonable appear, and upon reading the words with due
emphasis on the punctuation, they seem to say that the reasonable
use theory is not applied to uses of public water already established.
That is, the question in a case would not be whether there was an
unreasonable use of the water, but whether the use has injured the
landowner by interfering with a prior existing use. This is the prin-
ciple that has been adopted by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in
applying the natural flow theory,27 but it is the intention of the
legislature not to apply that theory to riparian rights. Therefore, it
would be clearer if the word "unreasonable" were inserted just after
the conjunction "or" as was done in the immediately following phrase.
The courts may very well make this insertion in interpreting the
statute, but if they do not, the wording should be corrected by the
Kentucky legislature.
When a stream is at its lowest ebb because of an existing drought,
every contiguous landowner turns to it to use the water on his suffering
crops and stock. In subsection 3 of section 3 (Ky. REv. STAT. sec.
'Anderson v. Cincinnati So. Ry., 86 Ky. 44, 5 S.W. 49 (1887). The Court
of Appeals said: ". . .if the dam so obstructs the water as to diminish the flow
and lessen the capacity of the water below, it is an injury to the proprietor for
which damages may be awarded. The question, therefore, in this case is not
whether the railroad company made an unreasonable use of the water, but whether
its use for the purpose of the railroad injured the mill below."
' Supra note 20, subsec. 3.
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262.690(3)) an attempt is made to get the landowner to impound
water while it is at its excess, such as in a flood period, so that the
water will be available during a later drought.2 Before the present
act, a landowner who impounded water was liable if as a result the
lower riparian owner was denied his lawful use of the water.2 9 Such
strict liability is now avoided by allowing and encouraging dams or
other devices to be used to conserve water for later use in the low-
flow seasons. In the words of Mr. Henry Ward, Kentucky Com-
missioner of Conservation, in explaining the purpose of the Bill to
the legislature, "That is the most important single aspect of the whole
problem."30
The landowner is permitted to impound the public water when
". the flow in the stream or the level of the lake is in excess of
existing reasonable use."31 The difficulty to be met in analyzing this
language is obvious. What constitutes a "reasonable use" under the
circumstances will have to be determined, and too, just how much
more than a reasonable use will be "in excess." Both of these un-
knowns will have to be further defined by judicial interpretation be-
fore the farmer will be able to impound water, as the act provides,
with some assurance that he has complied with the act.
There is also a condition attached to the right of a riparian owner
to impound public water under subsection 3 which provides that if
an obstruction is placed across a stream, an outlet shall be provided
to release water beyond what the owner is entitled to use. The owner
is entitled to use a reasonable amount, and therefore, he must release,
and continue to release, an amount of water that will prevent him
from storing an unreasonable portion. This would include a stream
sufficient to furnish a lower riparian owner at least his fair share for
domestic purposes. As the drought ensues the owner would have to
continue to let some water out, and it would seem that at the time
he would need water most, he would have released most of what he
had stored.
It is thus seen from the preceding discussion of House Bill 497
that Kentucky has taken an important step in defining some basic
points on the rights of riparian proprietors. In an initial statute of this
sort, ambiguous provisions are certain to arise, though the General
Assembly seems to have avoided many major difficulties which could
King v. Board of Council City of Danville, 128 Ky. 321, 107 S.W. 1189
(1908) Warmark v. Holbrook, 7 Ky. Opin. 614 (1874).
'A Review of Efforts to Produce a Declaration of Policy and Basic Law on
the Broad Subject of Water Resources," a statement issued by Henry Ward, Com-
missioner of Conservation of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, released to the legis-
lature while it was in general session.
' Supra note 20, subsec. 3.
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have arisen. Such ambiguity, as for instance, what constitutes a
reasonable use or an excess of existing reasonable uses, will have to be
determined by the Court of Appeals after considering the circum-
stances of the cases as they arise. If judicial interpretation is not
sufficient to eliminate this difficulty, the only alternative is to amend
the statute in the next session of the General Assembly.
House Bill 497 is not intended to be a comprehensive water law.
It would be impossible to devise a law which would solve all problems
before they arise. If the recent serious droughts in the state continue,
more farmers will prepare to meet their water needs through irriga-
tion,3 2 and the incidence of water rights litigation will surely increase.
In the fourth and final section of the Bill the Legislative Research
Commission has been directed to conduct a study of other specific
water problems.33 If it is the aim of the legislature to enact a com-
plete water code eventually, the enactment of this statute is a good
beginning.
J. ArNA GxroRY, JR.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CAPACITY TO MARRY
In Littreal v. Littreal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was asked
to reverse a decree annulling the marriage of an adjudged incom-
petent. The husband married after he had been adjudged incompetent
and a committee had been appointed. After a short time he abandoned
the wife at the request of his daughter. The wife, upon being notified
by the committee that she would have to leave the home of the hus-
band, filed suit for separate maintenance. The committee filed an
answer and counterclaim asking that the marriage be declared null
and void due to the husband's lack of mental capacity. The trial court
annulled the marriage and the wife appealed. The Court of Appeals
reversed the chancellor on the ground that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to establish the mental incapacity of the husband at the time of
marriage.
It is significant to point out that only the marriage of an idiot or
'For data of increased irrigation in Kentucky, see note Ky. L.J. 493(1954).
'(House Bill 497 as adopted provided in full: "Section 4. The General
Assembly recognizes that many specific problems relating to water resources exist.
To secure addtional information on this subject the Legislative Research Com-
mission is hereby directed to conduct a study of water resources, usage and
rights and report its finding to the General Assembly at the 1956 session. All other
agencies of the Commonwealth shall cooperate with the Legislative Research
Commission in making this study when requested by the Commission to do so."
1253 S.W. 2d 247 (Ky. 1952).
